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This paper investigates factors associated with audit firm positrons on Auditing Standards Board 
~ssucs during the three-year period ending during 19X4. The maJor findrng is that tirms v,rth 
relatively structured audit technologies tend to favor propnsed statements while firms uith 
relatively unstructured technologies do not. Audit firm size is not associated uith firm posrtron. 
Also, Big X firms favoring proposed statements have lower staff-to-partner ratios and concentrate 
less in auditing. The stat?to-partner ratio is negatively associated with technology. The results’ 
implications for auditing profession organization studres and auditing and tinancial reporting 
research are investigated. 
1. Introduction 
The cost and benefit of a system of audited accounting information is 
potentially affected by officially established accounting and audit reporting 
rules and rules governing sufficiency of audit evidence. Various theories have 
been proposed to explain accounting standards voting and lobbying behavior. 
For example, it has been suggested that Accounting Principles Board members 
chose accounting rules based on the preferences of the member’s firm’s major 
clients [Wheat (1972) Rockness and Nikolai (1977)]. Also, it has been argued 
that corporate managements lobby in support of accounting rules that benefit 
management [Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Horngren (1973)]. Similarly. 
there have been charges that Big 8 auditing firms dominate auditing standards 
setting [U.S. Congress (Metcalf Report) (1976)]. 
In this paper. we explore auditing firm preferences and voting patterns for 
recent auditing and reporting issues considered by the Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB). Groups of firms commonly vote together (or express the same 
preference) on seemingly diverse issues. We propose a positive theory to 
explain the observed vote pattern. In particular, we hypothesize that firms’ 
votes are a function of their use of a structured auditing technology. 
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For the three-year period studied, a relative technology measure is associated 
with preferences for proposed statements and the size of the firm is not. This 
result is consistent with the proposed technology-based economic theory and 
inconsistent with the charge that large firms dominate the standard setting 
process. 
The paper is organized as follows. Structured and unstructured approaches 
to auditing are contrasted in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the nature and 
role of the ASB and the audit firms’ economic self-interest in codifying 
auditing standards respectively. Section 5 presents the issues discussed by the 
ASB during the three-year sample period, while section 6 describes the 
empirical measures used in the study. Results of the analyses are presented in 
section 7, followed by conclusions in section 8. 
2. Structured vs. unstructured audit approaches 
Audit firms have adopted audit technologies along a structured-unstruc- 
tured continuum [Cushing and Loebbecke (1983)]. Structured firms tend to (1) 
require use of statistical sampling, (2) use structured internal control evalua- 
tions that culminate in a prescribed audit plan, and (3) use formal scoring 
sheets or rules for integrating audit test results. Examples of structured firms’ 
techniques include Stringer (1963) (Deloitte Haskins & Sells) on dollar-unit 
sampling, Stringer (1975) on regression analysis in analytical review, Elliott 
and Rogers (1972) (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.) on statistical sampling and 
its relation to internal control scoring rules, and Zuber, Leisenring, Kinney and 
Elliott (1983) on allocating materiality among accounts to control the risk of 
undetected material error in financial statements. Examples of firms’ oper- 
ationalization of the structured approach in Statements on Auditing Standards 
(SASS) are provided by Holstrum and Kirtland (1982) (Deloitte Haskins and 
Sells), Elliott (1983), and Touche Ross & Co. (1981).’ 
Unstructured firms, on the other hand, tend to use less structured guidance 
and leave more considerations to the judgment of the field auditor. Statistical 
sampling may be used in some situations but its use is not required. For 
example, in the ninth edition of Montgomery’s Auditing Defliese, Johnson and 
MacLeod (three partners of Coopers & Lybrand) (1975, pp. 146-149) discuss 
statistical audit sampling but emphasize a limited role for its use. Internal 
control evaluation aids may be used, but the auditor is not directed toward a 
particular conditional audit plan. Finally, the integration of test results and 
consideration of audit risk is not formalized. An example of an unstructured 
approach is provided by Sullivan (1984) (Coopers & Lybrand). 
‘The latter states ‘The Touche Ross Audit Process is distinguished from traditional approaches 
through the use of a conceptual framework for designing and structuring CI detuiled progrcm for 
each specific audit engagement’ (emphasis added) (p. 1). 
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With respect to audit reporting, a structured firm is expected to specify 
conditions under which the auditor is to modify the audit opinion. For 
example, Touche Ross (1982) uses a table based on liquidity and net worth to 
develop the appropriate audit opinion/footnote disclosure combination for 
savings and loan associations. A structured firm is also expected to favor 
reporting options that specify criteria for opinion modification. 
Finally, structured firms are more likely to believe that auditor consensus is 
desirable. That is, in a given situation different auditors should conduct similar 
audits and give the same opinion. The Mock and Turner (1981) study of 
auditor judgement consensus was instrumental in influencing top management 
of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. to adopt a more structured approach. Similar 
internal studies in the 1960s at Deloitte Haskins & Sells preceded development 
of that firm’s structured approach. Unstructured firms, on the other hand, are 
more likely to emphasize the need for individual judgments and accept 
reasonable variation in audit plans and audit reports under seemingly similar 
circumstances. 
In this paper we assume that a firm chooses a technology and then expresses 
a preference for profession-wide auditing standards that are consistent with 
that technology. We do not have a well developed theory to predict the firm’s 
choice of technology, so to help develop such a theory data are collected on 
several firm-specific organizational factors that we expect are related to tech- 
nology choice. Specifically, data are collected on (1) the number of auditors in 
each firm, (2) audit staffing (ratio of audit staff to audit partners), (3) audit 
concentration (ratio of audit fees to total fees), and (4) an estimate of the 
average stock price beta for each firm’s client portfolio. 
3. The Auditing Standards Board 
The ASB is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s (AICPA) 
senior technical body charged with interpreting generally accepted auditing 
standards. It is comprised of fifteen AICPA members with no more than five 
members from Big 8 firms. The Board has always included five members from 
Big 8 firms, nine members from non-Big 8 firms and one member from 
academia. 
The Board was formed in 1978 as a result of the recommendations of the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities which were, in part, a reaction to 
the Metcalf Report of 1976 [U.S. Congress (1976)J. The Metcalf Report 
charged that the Big 8 had dominated the AICPA which in turn had dominant 
influence over both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
ASB’s predecessor, the Auditing Standards Executive Committee. The Report 
notes (p. 11) that all Big 8 firms and 14 of the largest 15 CPA firms then had 
members on the Auditing Standards Executive Committee. Hence, large firms 
controlled 14 votes on the 21-member Committee. The Big 8 or the largest 15 
firms might dominate Committee votes by voting large firm interests as a 
block. Whether large firms did, in fact, vote as a block was not established. 
However, partly in reaction to the Metcalf Report, the 1977-78 Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee was restructured to include only five members 
from Big 8 firms. In 1978, the Committee became the 15member ASB with a 
maximum of five Big 8 firm members. 
The. ASB’s charge includes responsibility for ‘promulgation of auditing 
standards and procedures to be observed by members of the AICPA in 
accordance with the Institute’s rules of conduct’ [AICPA (1984, app. A)]. The 
ASB issues SASS which are interpretations of the ten Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS). GAAS and SASS are used by the legal system as 
the basis for determining whether an auditor has conducted an adequate or 
‘standard quality’ audit under the common law or the securities acts. Thus, the 
ASB’s activities lead to pronouncements with quasi-legal stature. 
Most proposed SASS add structure or require auditor actions with respect to 
audits under GAAS in that they specify application of certain procedures, 
consideration of certain factors or denote conditions under which particular 
reports are to be given. These SASS provide the primary focus of this paper. 
Some proposed SASS do not relate to required audit actions or practices and 
hence do not affect audit structure. For example, some proposed SASS that 
arise in response to an interest by governmental regulatory bodies do not affect 
audit structure. These include SAS No. 41 entitled ‘Working Papers’ and SAS 
No. 46 entitled ‘Consideration of Omitted Procedures After the Report Date’. 
Neither statement affects how standard quality audits are to be conducted. 
Other standards limit the nature and extent of auditor responsibilities, thus 
leading to a better public understanding of the auditor’s role (e.g., SAS No. 16 
entitled ‘The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors 
and Irregularities’). 
4. Economic self-interest in audit standard setting 
An audit firm can benefit from SASS in several ways. The codification and 
structuring of audit practice can increase the value of the signal sent by the 
firm’s audit, enable the firm to reduce its staff training costs, reduce its legal 
costs and reduce the likelihood that more costly government regulation of 
auditing will be imposed. 
AICPA membership implies adherence to that bodies’ standards and hence 
can provide a positive signal on the member firm’s audit quality. In that case 
some firms may choose to free-ride on the signal by joining the AICPA and 
then not complying with the AICPA’s standards. To the extent that SASS make 
detection and punishment of such free-riding more cost-efficient, they reduce 
its frequency and increase the value of the signal. Also, since SASS are taught 
in colleges and universities, staff training costs can be reduced [Hicks (1974) 
and Mautz (1958)]. 
Since SASS are used by the legal system to determine whether an auditor has 
conducted an adequate audit, SAS codification of audit practice enables the 
audit firm to adopt audit practices that reduce its legal liability and expected 
legal costs. To the extent that SASS improve average audit quality. they reduce 
the number of audit failures. This, in turn reduces the likelihood of costly 
government intervention in auditing. 
The above benefits of best audit practice codification via SASS apply to 
auditors in general. However. the costs of codification are likely to vary across 
firms. SASS that increase audit structure will be less costly for audit firms that 
have adopted a structured audit technology similar to that required by the 
SASS. They will be more costly for audit firms that use an unstructured 
technology. Those unstructured firms will have to incur costs to implement the 
technology. Further, the structured technology is likely to be less efficient for 
the clients of unstructured firms. Those clients probably chose to be audited by 
an unstructured audit firm because that alternative was cost efficient. Thus. 
other things equal. structured firms are expected to support and unstructured 
firms are expected not to support SASS adding required audit actions. 
Thus, audit firms have different economic interests in codification of some 
auditing standards due to differing incidence of cost. Representing those 
interests may economically justify a major commitment of personnel time to 
ASB activities, AICPA task forces and sub-committees. Hence, the auditing 
standards environment provides a direct link between standard setting behav- 
ior and economic self-interest. 
5. ASB voting and the issues 
On all ASB ballots to issue an exposure draft or final pronouncement, a 
60-percent majority. or nine votes, is required. Most votes are not close. 
however. For example, during the 1981-82. 1982-83 and 1983-84 board years 
twenty ballots on final statements (or separable parts of statements) were 
taken. All passed and fourteen were passed unanimously. Of the remaining six. 
two passed 14-1, two passed 13-2 and one each was passed 12-3 and lo--5 
(see table 1). 
There are several reasons for the strong support of a final SAS. Most issues 
are not controversial or have little firm-specific interest that can be identified. 
Also the lengthy ‘due process’ procedures and board discussions often lead to 
substantial agreement or a negotiated compromise on the substance or at least 
the wording of a proposed SAS. As board members become familiar with an 
issue, some positions are changed and a consensus develops. As a result of 
board discussions, basic changes in member’s positions have been noted. Some 
board members also report that they have changed their personal position on 
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Table 1 
Summary votes on SASS issued during 1981-X2.1982-83 and 19X3-84. 











Supplementary mineral re5erve information February lY82 13-2 
Working papers April 19X2 15-O 
Reporting on condensed financial statements 











Receivables and inventories 
Consistency of application of generally 
accepted accounting principles 
Public warehouses - Controls and auditing 
procedures for goods held 
Reports on audited financial statements 
The meaning of ‘present fairly in con- 
formity with GAAP’ in the independent 
auditor’s report 
X. Letters for undetwriters 
9. Audit sampling 
,nibus SAS: 
Generally accepted auditing standards 
The auditor’s study and evaluation of 
internal control 
Special purpose reports on internal 
accounting control at service 
organizations 
Omnibus SAS - 1983 
1. Substantive tests prior to the balance 
sheet date 
2. Related parties 
3 Supplementary oil and gas rescrvc 
information 
Consideration of omitted procedures 
after the report date 
Audit risk and materiality in conducting 
an audit 
The effects of computer processing on the 
examination of financial statements 
Letters for underwriters 
Deccmhcr 1982 
August 19X3 
Septcmbcr 1983 14-I 


















an issue but their firm (and the position expressed) has not [see Zeff (1984, p. 
462) for a similar phenomenon in setting accounting standards]. 
Finally, once it is clear that a proposed SAS will pass, there is an incentive 
for a firm not to publicly oppose the statement and risk appearing to be out of 
step with the profession as a whole. Often, proposed SASS arise from a well 
publicized audit failure or practice problem [Jaenicke (1977. p. 79)]. To oppose 
such a regulation or one that has been suggested by a regulatory body such as 
Table 2 
Topics on the ASB agenda during the period 1981-84, the hours of agenda time for each topic and 
the ASB’s action on the topic, 
Topic 
Audit risk and materiality 
Contingencies and uncertainties 
Forecasts and projections 
Consideration of omitted proccdurcs 
after the balance sheet date 
Lcvcls of a.swrancc 
Lcttcrs to undcrwritcrs 
Substantive tests prior to the 
balance sheet date 
Audit sampling 














Tabled. April 19X4 
Exposure draft 
SAS No. 46 
Under diacusGn. not voted 
SAS No. 49 
SAS No. 45. part 1 
SAS No. 43, part 0 
Various resolutions 
Total 410 
“Topic is included In analvsls (53% of total). 
‘Each topic comprised lexs than 5c”r of total hcurs 
the SEC or the AICPA’s Public Oversight Board may appear to be self-serving. 
Thus the great majority of final votes are unanimous or nearly unanimous. 
In contrast to final ballots, votes for exposure and intermediate votes for 
continuing development of a statement are sometimes close. During its 1981-82. 
1982283 and 1983-84 years, the board had an agenda of 35 basic topics with 
six yielding three or more members opposed. In the empirical work to follow 
we focus on these three board years and six issues since principal votes by each 
board member are recorded.2 
Seven issues, each accounting for more than five percent of the total agenda 
time, collectively consumed 272 hours or 63% of the total hours for the 
three-year period (see Table 2). Two of these are not analyzed. ‘Levels of 
Assurance’ had not progressed beyond the preliminary discussion stage as of 
September 30, 1984, and no preference votes had been taken. ‘Letters to 
Underwriters’ (SAS No. 49) passed unanimously in both its exposure draft and 
final form. Thus, while these topics consumed considerable Board time there 
was no measure of preference in one case and no apparent controversy in the 
other. 
Five of the seven time consuming issues had exposure draft ballots with 
three or more votes against exposure. A sixth issue, deferral of the effective 
‘Summary vote tallies are available for issues of pnor years. but individual votes are identifiable 
only for SASs that were ultimately issued. This lack of record for intermediate preference votes hv 
members has impeded the work of prior researchers in audit standard setting voting behavior 
[Pearson, Lindgren And Myers (1979)) and in accounting standards [e.g., Selto and Grove (1987)]. 
date of SAS No. 39, regulating audit sampling, accounted for only seven hours 
of board time but passed 10-5 in 1982 (culminating in SAS No. 43, part 9). 
and a second deferral proposal failed 8-7 in 1983. This issue is included 
because of the strong disagreement and SAS No. 39 consumed about 10% of 
the 1980-81 board’s meeting time. 
Thus, six ‘controversial’ issues from the ASB’s agenda for 1981-84 are 
analyzed. The six issues are: 
1. deferral of the effective date of ‘Audit Sampling’ (SAS No. 39) 
2. exposure of ‘Audit Risk and Materiality’ (SAS No. 47) 
3. exposure of ‘Substantive Tests Prior to the Balance Sheet Date’ (SAS No. 
45, part 1). 
4. exposure of ‘Prospective Financial Statements’, 
5. exposure of ‘Consideration of Omitted Procedures after the Report Date’ 
(SAS No. 46) and 
6. preference votes to continue development and exposure of a proposal to 
eliminate ‘subject to’ qualifications as an auditor’s reporting option for 
client uncertainties. 
Each of SAS No. 39 and issues 2, 3 and 4 potentially add structure to the 
audit process. Both SAS No. 39 and SAS No. 47 concern the sufficiency of 
audit evidence and both consider control of the risk of incorrectly accepting 
financial statements that are materially in error. SAS No. 39 is focused at the 
account balance level, while SAS No. 47 focuses on the aggregate or financial 
statement level.3 SAS No. 45, part 1, provides a framework of required 
considerations if principal detailed audit tests are applied prior to the balance 
sheet date. Finally, the exposure draft of ‘Prospective Financial Statements’ 
gives requirements as to evidence and the report form for such forward-looking 
information. 
According to the arguments of section 4, structured firms are expected to 
support proposals 2, 3, and 4, which increase audit structure, and to oppose 
deferral of the effective date of SAS No. 39, which also would increase audit 
structure. Unstructured firms are expected to oppose proposals 2, 3 and 4, and 
to favor deferral of SAS No. 39. 
Deferral of SAS No. 39 perhaps best illustrates a technology based con- 
troversy. SAS No. 39 was approved in June 1981, by a 15-O vote (with a 
qualified assent by A. Mentzel of Coopers & Lybrand). For various reasons, 
‘Existing standards provide some structure, of course, and compliance wth them shows tirm 
preferences. In a study of a firm procedures manuals and training materials Cushing and 
Loebbecke (1983) found, for example, that five of the twelve largest firms do not document 
‘preliminary estimates of materiality’ that are discussed in SAS No. 22. 
SAS No. 39 was given an effective date for audit periods ending after June 23, 
1982. In March 1982, several requests from small firms led to a proposal to 
delay the effective date until June 23, 1983. A majority of the board agreed 
(10-5) and the proposal was made a part of the ‘omnibus’ SAS No. 43. In 
March 1983, a request from the Technical Issues Committee of the AICPA’s 
Private Companies Practice Section and approximately 200 supporting com- 
ment letters led to Board consideration of a second deferral of SAS No. 39’s 
effective date.4 The second proposal to defer received an 8-7 vote, and thus 
was one vote short of the required 60 percent majority. 
SAS No. 46 gives guidance on what the auditor should do when he or she 
decides that a standard quality audit may not have been conducted. It arose 
from a request from the AICPA’s Public Oversight Board after the peer review 
process had indicated that some auditors had not been applying ‘auditing 
procedures considered necessary.. . in the circumstances.. . .’ The SAS does not 
add requirements for a standard quality audit and, therefore, yields no 
technology-based predictions of support. However, due to the Public Oversight 
Board’s interest the SAS might reduce audit firms’ expected cost of government 
intervention [see Watts and Zimmerman (1979)]. Thus, support by larger, more 
politically visible, audit firms might be expected. 
The technology-based theory of section 3 can lead to alternative predictions 
of support for eliminating the ‘subject to’ opinion reporting option. Therefore. 
some background on ‘subject to’ opinions and their proposed elimination is 
needed. Auditor reporting on uncertainties as specified in SAS No. 2 allows the 
auditor to issue an uncertainty qualified ‘subject to’ opinion, but criteria for 
when such an option is required or desirable is largely unspecified. Paragraph 
24 states: ‘When there are material uncertainties, the outcome of which is not 
susceptible of reasonable estimation, the auditor should consider whether to 
express an unqualified opinion or to qualify his opinion’ (emphasis added). 
However, there are no criteria for determining whether to qualify for ‘reason- 
ably possible’ material losses [AICPA (1984), section 9509.14)]. 
Criteria based on the auditor’s assessment of the probability distribution of 
possible losses could, of course, be specified. Such criteria are problematic, 
however, since auditors report on conformity of client financial statements with 
GAAP and, under Statement on Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 
(section 4311) management is not required to elaborate with respect to their 
assessment of the probability distribution on loss contingencies. Furthermore. 
for loss contingencies involving lawsuits, elaboration by the auditor might 
result in a self-fulfilling prophesy. Thus, even auditors who prefer structure are 
4The Technical Issues Committee Chairwoman had requested such letters from managing 
partners of members of the Division of Firms of the AICPA. Five unsolicited letters ivere received 
from such firms in favor of retaining the effective date. All tivc were from members of an 
association of firma that use dollar-unit sampling 
not expected to support specific reporting criteria beyond that required of 
management under GAAP.’ 
One can argue that elimination of the reporting option is a feasible solution 
to the lack of criteria problem and would be supported by structured firms as a 
means of reducing variation in reporting. Alternatively, since elimination leads 
to fewer required audit considerations, one might argue that elimination would 
be supported by unstructured firms or that since no required actions are added, 
the theory yields no predictions. Thus, technology-based predictions are less 
clear on this issue than the other five. 
6. Empirical measures 
Twenty-three practicing auditors from twenty-two different firms served on 
the board for at least one of the 1981-82, 1982-83 or 1983-84 board years. 
These firms’ positions on the six issues are measured by the actual votes 
expressed by its member (if the firm is represented at the time of the vote) or 
by the position taken in firms’ public comment letters on exposure drafts 
issued and positions taken in ASB task force meetings (if the firm is not 
represented at the time of a ballot). Thus, 107 votes or stated preferences of 22 
firms are available for the six controversial issues discussed in section 5. 
Preferences on all issues are scored on a three-point scale. For the four 
exposure drafts (issues 2, 3, 4 and 5) a ‘3’ is assigned if the board member (or 
firm) assented, ‘1’ is assigned if the member dissented, and ‘2’ is assigned for a 
qualified assent or a neutral position. 
Deferral of SAS No. 39 was ballotted twice. A ‘3’ is assigned if a member 
expressed a preference not to defer (i.e., to make the statement effective as 
planned), on either (single) ballot or on both ballots if the member expressed a 
preference both times. A ‘1’ is assigned if either single ballot or both ballots 
supported deferral, and ‘2’ is assigned if a member supported deferral on the 
first ballot and did not support deferral on the second. 
During the 1981-82 board year, the proposed elimination of ‘subject to’ 
opinions was on the agenda for five meetings and a special public meeting. 
Four preference votes for continuing development of a proposed SAS began 
with a vote of 9-6 in October 1981 and ended in July 1982 with a 5-9 vote on 
a proposal to prepare an exposure draft.6 Six members had position changes. A 
‘Such criteria also seem to go beyond the scope of auditing as defined under GAAS. For 
example, the first sentence of the Cod~ficcrtlon [AICPA (1984, section llO.Ol)] states: ‘The 
objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the independent auditor is the 
expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present financial position, results of 
operations. and changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles.’ Also SAS No. 2 (paragraph 24) states: ‘The auditor’s function in forming an opinion 
on tinancial statements does not include estimating the outcome of future events if management is 
unable to do so.’ 
‘The board continued to develop alternative guidance until April 1984. when the topic was 
tabled pending resolution of more pressing matters. 
‘3’ is assigned to members who consistently favored elimination of ‘subject to’ 
opinions, a ‘1’ to those consistently opposed, and a ‘2’ to those who changed 
position. 
To assess a firm’s audit practice as to structure, a composite of expert 
opinion is constructed. Four members of the AICPA’s statistical sampling 
subcommittee were asked first to classify the Big 8 firms into three categories. 
Following Cushing and Loebbecke (1983). the basis for classification is the 
extent to which a firm uses a structured guidance approach in audit sampling, 
internal control evaluation and integration of audit test results. The subcom- 
mittee members were asked to name the two or three most structured firms. the 
two or three least structured and the two to four in the middle. A ‘3’ was 
assigned to most structured, ‘1’ for least structured, and ‘2’ for intermediate 
firms. After classifying the Big 8, the evaluators were asked to evaluate the 
three ‘next seven’ firms with representation on the board. In addition, each 
board member was asked to classify his or her own firm into one of the three 
groups relative to the Big 8. As indicated below, the model value of the 
available scores or the equally-weighted mean is used as the measure of firm 
technology. The two measures are consistent.’ 
The technology rankings have the following support. First. the interrater 
Spearman rank correlations are all greater than or equal to 0.80 and significant 
at the 0.01 level or better. Second, five of the Big 8 knew their firm’s technology 
rankings based on an analysis of audit policy and procedures manuals as 
determined by Cushing and Loebbecke (1983). The reported rankings are 
consistent with the rankings of Cushing and Loebbecke. Finally. two firms 
have recently publicly discussed the relative merits of the structured and 
unstructured approaches to auditing [see Mullarkey (1984) and Sullivan (1984)]. 
Touche Ross favored a structured approach and is ranked as a structured firm. 
Coopers & Lybrand favored an unstructured approach and is ranked as an 
unstructured firm. 
Following the Metcalf Report (1976) size is measured on a three-point 
ordinal scale grouping Big 8 firms, the ‘next seven’, and smaller firms not in 
the largest fifteen. Other measures obtained are (I) the number of auditors who 
were partners or employees of the firm in 1982,’ (2) the staffing ratio (staff to 
partners) for 1982, (3) audit concentration (estimated ratio of audit fees to 
total fees) for 1982, and (4) the average stock price betas of each firm’s client 
portfolio. The number of audit staff and partners are obtained from each of the 
22 firms. The audit and total fee measures for the Big 8 are from the Public 
Accounting Report and average betas for the Big 8 are from Shank and 
Murdock (1978). 
‘All firms with a mode of ‘1’ had a weighted mean of one. while the means of those with a mode 
of ‘2’ ranged from 1.8 to 2.2, and the lowest mean for firms with a mode of ‘3’ was 2.6. 
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3 2 1 6 
3 1 1 s - 
x 3 11 22 
a Based on modal ranking on technology: 
~,~,srrrcctured,firms: Coopers & Lybrand; Price Waterhouse: nine small firms. 
/,~tern~crdicrrefirnls: Arthur Andersen: Arthur Young: Ernst & Whinncy: Laventhol & Horwath: 
Main Hurdman; one small firm. 
Sfrucrured firm.?: Deloitte Haskins & Sells: Peat. Mawick. Mitchell; Touche Rosh; McGladrey. 
Hendrickson & Pullen: one small firm. 
7. Analysis 
Table 3 shows the cross-classification of technology and size as measured by 
the Metcalf Report classification (no x2 is reported due to the small expected 
sizes for the cells). Note that while there is a concentration of small firms in the 
unstructured category, there is one intermediate and one structured small firm. 
The structured intermediate-sized firm as well as the small firms in the 
structured and intermediate categories have been members of an association of 
CPA firms that applies a dollar-unit sampling plan as their principal sampling 
method. All five structured firms make extensive use of dollar-unit sampling 
and ordinarily specify its use by field auditors. 
Table 4 shows the cross-classification of the 107 standards preferences with 
technology and two size measures. Panel (a) presents results for technology. If 
the observations in the panel are independent, the xz value allows rejection of 
the hypothesis of independence of standards preferences and technology at the 
0.001 level. Furthermore, the probability level of the xZ value is not sensitive 
to the inclusion of the mixed (‘2’) preference scores with either the ‘I’ or the ‘3’ 
positions. Panels (b) and (c) of table 4 present results for standards preferences 
and two size classifications based on the Metcalf Report (small expected sizes 
for the cells prevent tabulation of a valid x2 for a 3 x 3 table). As shown, the 
x2 is not significant whether the ‘next seven’ are classified with the Big 8 or 
with firms not in the largest 15. 
The significance of the x2 values in table 4 is overstated by conventional 
tables since there are not 107 independent observations. There is only one 
measure of technology and size for each firm and a board member (firm) could 
be represented as many as six times in a row of the tables. However. the 
magnitude of the xz statistic for panel (a) suggests that the relation between 
Table 4 



















x = 2.960. Probability = 0.228 
Standards preference scores 
1 2 3 
26 6 10 
Y Y 17 
3 1 25 
3x 17 52 
Standards preference scores 
1 2 3 
15 x 25 
23 Y 27 
38 17 52 
Standards preference scores 
1 2 3 
20 13 33 
1X 4 19 














preferences and technology would still be significant if this dependence is 
taken into account. 
Table 5 shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients for preferences on 
each issue with technology scores and the number of auditors. Five of the 
correlations of technology with votes are positive, with all but one significant at 
the 0.02 level or better.’ The only insignificant correlation is for SAS No. 46 
‘The relation of voting to technology may be of fairly long standing. For example. the final 
version of Srcrtenwtr on Audirrng Procedures No. 54 (AICPA. November 1972) entitled ‘The 
Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control’ had assenting votes of all 71 members of the 
Committee on Auditing Procedures. However, five members gave qualified assents or dissents 
relating to the inclusion of Appendix B on statistical sampling. Three of these acre from Big 8 
tirms with Intermediate structure. one unstructured Big X and one small firm. It rcccived 
unqualified assents from the three structured Big 8 firms and two members from tirms belonging to 
the same association (of dollar-unit samplers) as the two structured non-Big X firms in the prcaent 
study. The other eleven members supporting the entire statement included an unstructured Big R 
tirm, two ‘next 7’ firms with intermediate structure and eight small turns uith unknown technolo- 
gies. 
Table 5 








Audit sampling (SAS No. 39) deferral 
(n = 20) 
Audit risk and materiality (SAS No. 47) 
(!I= 16) 
Substantive tests prior to the 
balance sheet date exposure 
draft (SAS No. 45, part 1) 
()I= 17) 
Prospective financial statements 
(!I= 17) 
Consideration of omitted procedures 
after the report date (SAS No. 46) 
( rr = 20) 
Contingencies and uncertainties 































‘Top entry is correlation, parenthetical entry is probability of a larger absolute value under the 
null. 
hThe correlation of technology with the number of auditors is 0.533 (probability 0 011. a = 22). 
‘Technology is measured using the equally weighted mean of technology scores. 
which is the only controversial issue with no obvious expected relation between 
preference and technology. In contrast, none of the number of auditors with 
preference correlations are significant at even the 0.10 level. 
Table 6 presents Spearman rank correlation coefficients for additional 
variables for the Big 8 firms. Included are the sum of preference scores on the 
six issues, technology, number of auditors, staffing ratios, audit concentration 
and portfolio beta. As shown in the first row of table 6, the positive correlation 
of the total vote score with technology is the only association significant at the 
0.05 level although the staffing ratio and audit concentration are significant at 
the 0.10 level. 
The only significant associations at the 0.10 level among variables other than 
the vote score are between audit concentration and portfolio beta and between 
technology and the staffing ratio. The latter correlation reflects the structured 
firms’ apparent tendency to have fewer audit staff per partner than the 
unstructured firms. This is consistent with structured technology allowing a 
reduction in staff time relative to partners. It is inconsistent with the hypothe- 
sis that use of structured technology allows a wider span of control of 
subordinates. The audit concentration with portfolio beta correlation is in- 
fluenced by the fact that Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Price Waterhouse have 
Table 6 
Spearman rank correlations between sum of standards preference scores, technology and audit firm 
characteristics” (Big 8 firms only). 
Technologyh 
Number of Staffing 
auditors ratio 
Sum of standards 
preference scores’ 
Technology 
Number of auditors 
Staffing ratio 
O.RO4 - 0.229 ~ 0.663 
(0.016) (0.585) (0.073) 







~ 0.685 0.349 
(0.061) (0.396) 
- 0.378 0.194 
(0.356) (0.645) 
~ 0.072 ~ 0.357 
(0.866) (0.3X5) 





“Top entry is correlation. parenthetical entry is probability of a larger absolute value under the 
null. 
hTechnology is measured using the equally weighted mean of technology scores. 
‘Over all six issues. 
the two highest revenue concentrations in auditing and the two lowest portfolio 
betas. It is as if the low-beta firms choose auditors who concentrate in auditing 
as opposed to tax and consulting. However, these two firms are among the 
most different among the Big 8 in staffing ratios and, of course, technology. 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells seems to be an outlier in that it has an unusually 
low portfolio beta and high audit concentration for its technology (and voting 
behavior). The deletion of Deloitte Haskins & Sells raises the votes with audit 
concentration correlation to - 0.973 (p = 0.001) and the votes with portfolio 
beta to 0.721 (p = 0.068). Also the correlation of technology with audit 
concentration goes to - 0.771 ( p = 0.043) and technology with portfolio beta 
to 0.709 (p = 0.074). It is interesting to note that the two potential merger 
candidates (Price Waterhouse and Deloitte Haskins & Sells) are alike in their 
concentration in auditing and clients with low betas but different in technol- 
ogy, staff/ratio and voting behavior. With respect to the latter, the two firms 
did not express the same preference on any of the six controversial issues. 
8. Conclusions 
A pattern seems to exist for votes or preferences expressed on controversial 
auditing standards issues considered by the ASB. The pattern is related to 
technological preference for structured vs. unstructured auditing. Firms that 
use a structured approach tend to support audit procedure and audit reporting 
proposals that add structured guidance. Firms that follow an unstructured 
approach generally oppose codification of such guidance. Furthermore, while 
there is some association between size and technology, there is no significant 
association between size and standards preferences. 
These results have several implications for those concerned with audit 
standard setting and research in auditing. First, they suggest the concern 
expressed in the Metcalf Report about large firm or Big 8 dominance of the 
audit standard setting process is misplaced. Several large firms and several 
smaller firms supported each position on the controversial issues. 
Second, the results suggest that the composition of the standards setting 
board influences the nature of auditing standards. A board comprised of 
members from structured firms will likely pass more structured SASS than 
would a board comprised of members from firms using an unstructured 
technology and vice versa. 
Finally, researchers studying auditors’ behavior with respect to procedures 
or reporting, or studying the organization of the profession ought to consider 
the potential effects of firms’ technological preferences. For example, if an 
audit judgment experiment includes auditors from a structured and an unstruc- 
tured firm, the estimate of the firm effect would include any basic technology 
effects. A sample from say, two structured firms would not. Similarly, a sample 
from a structured Big 8 and a structured small firm will likely underestimate 
the etfects of size differences over the population of audit firms. 
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